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This study investigates the eﬀects of relationship lending on ﬁrm innovativeness using a panel
of Italian manufacturing ﬁrms. In order to disentangle the impact of bank ties on the discovery
phase from that in the introduction phase of new technologies, the analysis proceeds in two
steps, estimating two distinct equations for each phase. As there are conﬂicting theoretical
predictions on the eﬀects of the various sources of funding in the diﬀerent stages of the inno-
vative process, this study provides results for small and high-tech ﬁrms, so as to control for
ﬁrm heterogeneity, relying on both cross-section and panel data techniques.
Results suggest that for small ﬁrms, banks do not carry out a sophisticated intervention at the
stage of development of new technologies, playing their traditional role of ﬁnancing investments
of constrained ﬁrms. Diﬀerently, relationship banks do play an important role in both phases
for high-tech ﬁrms.
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As the fourth Community Innovation Survey highlighted, for the majority of European ﬁrms the
main obstacle inhibiting innovation is represented by ﬁnancial factors. Firm’s ﬁnancial need,
however, is not constant and varies in relation to ﬁrm characteristics as well as project phases.
For example, during the so-called seed phase, the ﬁnancial need to carry out a feasibility study
is rather low, whereas it is high in the start-up phase, when the project has to be implemented.
During the early growth stage, instead, a ﬁrm requires considerable fundings in order to market
its innovative products. Lacking the visibility of more established ﬁrms, young and small ﬁrms are
likely to suﬀer even more for the ﬁnancing of their investments because of asymmetric information
problems (Berger and Udell (1998)). Moreover, the diﬀerent phases of a project are characterized
by diﬀerent degree of risk.
Despite these complex links between ﬁnance and innovation, and current richness of enterprise-
based innovation surveys, there is little in the existing micro-economic literature on the functions of
the various sources of funding across diﬀerent innovation phases. The main objective of this paper is
to rely on a panel of Italian manufacturing ﬁrms to ﬁll this gap, studying the eﬀects of relationship
lending - that is, close ties between borrowers and banks - in two diﬀerent phases of an innovative
process: the ‘discovery phase’, which captures ﬁrm ﬁnancial needs related to the development of
an innovation, and the ‘introduction phase’, which depicts ﬁnancial needs associated with bringing
products to the market. As Italian ﬁrms have strongly relied on relationship banking to ﬁnance
investments, focusing on these ﬁrms allows to isolate the role of bank-ﬁrm relationship in fostering
innovation.
In order to disentangle the eﬀects of bank ties on the discovery phase from those in the phase of
introduction and adoption of new technologies, and to master ﬁrm ﬁnancial need related to these
phases, the following analysis proceed in two steps, ﬁrst measuring ﬁrm propensity to innovate in the
discovery phase, and then by estimating ﬁrm intensity to innovate in the introduction phase. From
the econometric perspective, it means to adopt a generalised tobit model which tries to account
for the fact that ﬁrms are either innovative or not, and for those that are innovative, the extent
to which they are innovative by measuring the percentage of new products in total sales (Mohnen
1et al. (2006)). This strategy has several advantages. Firstly, it allows to distinguish in which phases
of an innovative project a relationship bank may play a role. Distinguishing between invention
and introduction of new technologies is also important in the light of ﬁrm innovation patterns,
as Italian ﬁrms tend to absorb innovations from outside than in carrying out research. Finally,
it allows to control for problems of selection due to ﬁrm unobserved characteristics. In recent
years, a number of panel estimators have been suggested for sample selection models where both
the selection equation and the equation of interest contain individual eﬀects which are correlated
with explanatory variables (Raymond et al. (2007), Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007)).
In particular, I will rely on the estimator proposed by Rochina-Barrachina (1999) which extend
Heckman’s two step estimator deriving an expression for the selectivity correction term for two
diﬀerent time periods.
As the empirical determinants of relationship lending have been already investigated in the
literature (i.e., Elsas (2005)), I will only describe its key determinants so as to focus on the reasons
why bank ties should aﬀect ﬁrm innovative capacity.
To get a complete picture, since the dataset also oﬀers indications on the other type of ﬁnancing,
I will take into account other sources of ﬁnance available to the ﬁrms, as well as the role of public
incentives. Since banks are by far the most important source of external ﬁnance in Italy, it is
reasonable to expect the internal sources to play a crucial role in ﬁnancing innovation.
Another important peculiarity of the banking system is its delimitation in local areas, in Italy
corresponding to 103 provinces, which are geographical units similar to US counties (Guiso et al.
(2004, 2006); Colombo and Turati (2004)). The geographical segmentation is relevant in order to
identify the level at which competition indicators, which are important control variables in the
present analysis, have to be computed.
Closely related to this analysis are the works of Benfratello et al. (2007) and Herrera and Minetti
(2007). However, it departs from Benfratello et al. (2007) for having a deeper look at the eﬀects
on innovation of speciﬁc bank-ﬁrm ties (such as the duration), distinguishing the discovery from
the introduction phase, instead of focusing on the level of ﬁnancial development. With respect
to the work of Herrera and Minetti (2007), the methodology adopted is substantially diﬀerent.
2These authors in fact investigated the possibility of endogeneity of the relationship variables while
estimating the probability of introducing innovation. In this work, the method of estimation will
account for this problem, considering in addition other important variables that in their work have
been neglected. In particular, the eﬀects of intensity of ﬁxed capital and R&D Investment, as well
as the role of internal source of ﬁnancing in the probability of being innovative.
The paper is structured in the following way. The next section gives an overview of the literature
while section 3, after a brief description of the empirical determinants of relationship lending,
explores its possible links with ﬁrm innovativeness. Section 4 presents the dataset and the main
descriptive statistics on the degree of ﬁrm innovativeness. Section 5 presents the model, which
distinguishes the introduction and discovery phases of innovation, and results for a cross-section
of ﬁrms using data from the ninth Capitalia survey. On the contrary, section 6 and 7 presents a
deeper analysis relying on panel data estimators for the discovery phase and introduction phase
respectively. The ﬁnal section summarizes the paper.
2 Literature Review
A lively macro-economic debate on the role of ﬁnancial architecture in fostering innovation and
technology is the one on the bank-based versus market-based system (i.e.,Carlin and Mayer (2003),
Levine (2002)). Are bank-based systems at the advantage in processing information particularly
relevant for ﬁrms’ incentive to innovate? The available evidence is rather mixed but ﬁndings
suggest that market-based system do not dominate bank-based system and vice-versa in all times.
However, knowledge-intensive industries, with soft, hard-to-monitor complex activities seem to get
on better in bank based ﬁnancial systems (Tadesse (2007)).
Even though researchers have argued theoretically, and tested empirically, that there is a link
between ﬁnance and innovation, there is still little in the existing micro-economic literature about
the functions of the various sources of funding in the diﬀerent phases of innovation (O’ Sullivan
(2004)). The main contribution of this paper is to make another step in this direction, enhancing
the understanding of the role played by bank ties in the phases of invention and introduction of
new technologies.
3In fact, this paper relates to two, somehow separated, strands of empirical literature. The ﬁrst
comprises articles on the economics of innovation. During the past decade, a number of countries
in Europe have implemented enterprise-based surveys of innovative activity (i.e., Community In-
novation Survey (CIS)). At the same, important progress has been made in modeling appropriate
econometric methods for innovation survey data (Raymond et al. (2007)). Hall and Mairasse (2006)
provide an interesting review of the empirical studies on innovation.
The second strand mainly relates to works investigating bank-ﬁrm relationship. Since there is
a vast literature on this topic, here I only refer to works related to the Italian banking system.
For a review, see Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) and Degryse and Ongena (2008). Some of these
works investigate the credit access for ﬁrms belonging to industrial districts. Relying on the ninth
Capitalia survey, Ughetto (2006) and Rotondi (2005) show that Italian ﬁrms in industrial districts
are less likely to be credit rationed. In particular, Alessandrini et al. (2008) evidence that the
incidence of relationship lending for ﬁrms in industrial districts is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
the average. Ferri and Messori (2000) show that arm’s length patterns prevail in the Northwest, the
area of oldest industrialization with larger banks and ﬁrms, whereas relationship banking patterns
prevail in the rest of the country, populated to a larger extent by smaller banks and ﬁrms.
Only a few works have investigated how the decisions to invest in innovation are aﬀected by
ﬁrm capacity to raise the necessary ﬁnancial means to realise an innovative project. The works of
Benfratello et al. (2007) and Herrera and Minetti (2007), which stress - at micro level - the role of
Italian banks in fostering innovation. Benfratello et al. (2007) ﬁnd strong evidence that banking
development has a signiﬁcant and important impact eﬀect on process innovation and a weaker for
product innovation. In addition, they ﬁnd that banking development has lessened the severity of ﬁ-
nancing constraints faced by small ﬁrms. Herrera and Minetti (2007) test the impact on innovation
of the information of the main bank - proxied by the duration of credit relationship. They observe
that ﬁrms with longer credit relationships have a higher probability to innovate. Furthermore, the
length of the relationship seems to foster the acquisition of new technologies rather than internal
research. Using a large panel of US companies, Atanassov et al. (2007) explore the relationship
between arm’s length ﬁnancing and innovation taking patents as a measure of innovative output.
4They found that ﬁrms that relied more on arm’s length ﬁnancing are associated with a larger
number of patents. They also conclude that this correlation is mainly driven by innovative ﬁrms
choosing their capital structure. Relying on ﬁrm-level data from a survey conducted in Finland,
but looking instead at the role of public policy, the work of Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) provides
evidence that capital-market imperfections delay innovation, and government funding dispropor-
tionately helps ﬁrms in industries that are more dependent on external ﬁnance. They used as a
measure of ﬁrm innovativeness the level of R&D expenditure.
None of these works, however, has investigated how ﬁnancial sources act on ﬁrm incentives to
innovate as well as on the eﬀective realization of innovation projects in products for the market.
3 Relationship lending and ﬁrm innovativeness
In this section, in order to identify the main variables to be used in the empirical analysis, ﬁrst,
I will brieﬂy describe the key determinants of relationship lending. Then, I will investigate the
reasons why relationship lending should aﬀect the phases of innovation. For a detailed description
of the empirical determinants of relationship lending see Elsas (2005), whereas for an analytical
survey on the eﬀects of relationship lending on the pricing of loans, as well as its eﬀect on the
degree of competition see Freixas (2005).
3.1 Determinants of relationship lending
Relationship lending represents the informational privilege that a bank accumulates over time by
establishing close ties with its borrower (Ongena and Smith (2001)). Reﬂecting the idea that long
tenure depicts the relationship intensity, the most commonly proxy for relationship lending is the
duration of a bank-borrower relationship. The exclusivity of bank relationship is also regarded
as an indicator of close ties between the bank and the borrower. In this regards, the number of
bank relationships should capture the possibility for bank to realize the economic beneﬁt associated
with the relationship. A negative correlation between the number of banks and the development
of relationship lending is reasonable. Finally, a higher debt ﬁnancing share should increase the
likelihood of relationship lending.
Credit concentration has also been identiﬁed as an important determinant of bank-ﬁrm ties
5(Ongena et al. (2007)). Asymmetric or concentrated borrowing may in fact play a role in balancing
the hold-up problem of relationship lending. Unfortunately, Capitalia survey does not provide such
information.
3.2 Relationship lending and innovation
In Italy relationship lending has always been a way to channel funds to productive investments.
In fact, despite its development, the stock market does not play a crucial role, while specialized
ﬁnanciers play a marginal role. In 2004, in the comparison between the Italian and the European
venture capital industry - in term of venture capital and private equity instruments over GDP -
Italy ranked 12th, with all other large European economies ranking well above. In addition, the
Italian venture capital industry is focused on later-stage investments: on average, in 2004, early
stage ﬁnancing represented only 2% of total investments in Italy compared with 6.4% in Europe
(Gregoriou et al. (2006)). Banks, in particular, turned out to be better suited to ﬁnance innova-
tion embodied in physical capital rather than technological progress (Ughetto (2007)). As Italian
ﬁrms typically do not receive external equity, internal equity ﬁnance (auto-ﬁnancing/cashﬂow)
represented an important source of innovation ﬁnancing as well. Capitalia survey shows that, in
2001-2003, for 83% of ﬁrms auto-ﬁnancing still represents the main source to ﬁnance innovation,
followed by 10% of ﬁrms relying more on public incentives, and 5% on banks loans.
Diﬀerent theoretical arguments point out that investment in R&D activities is diﬀerent from
investment in capital goods. First, R&D project may not be easily understood by outsiders and cre-
ate large intangible assets which cannot be used as a collateral (Hall (2002)). In addition, expected
returns of R&D are uncertain and diﬃcult to estimate. Finally, as suggested by Bhattacharya and
Chiesa (1995), ﬁrms may be reluctant to ﬁnance externally their R&D project for strategic reasons.
In which way then, relationship lending aﬀects ﬁrm innovative capacity? Can it mitigate ﬁrm
resort to internal ﬁnance? What makes a relationship lender special in fostering innovation?
The theoretical connections between innovation and relationship lending are diverse. First of
all, it is important to notice that banks, in addition to have a direct eﬀect on the quantity of R&D
and investment spending, may aﬀect the nature of the selected project, the quality of internal inputs
as well as their eﬀectiveness in generating innovation. In fact, as Boot (2000) argued, relationship
6banking goes beyond lending and includes other services as well. In this regard, relationship lending
leaves room for ﬂexibility and discretion allowing the utilization of non-contractable information
and addressing contractual features that are possibly unique. Furthermore, the ﬁrm can disclose
information to the bank without worrying about it divulges over competitors. Finally, bank ability
to oﬀer multi-period contracts, which are much more eﬀective than one-shot contracts (i.e. trans-
actions) in extracting information, may be helpful in the allocation process and the mechanisms
that allow ﬁrms to make commitments of resources to innovative activities, notwithstanding the
challenges of doing so.
On the other hand, close and durable relationship may also involve ineﬃciencies, mainly related
to the hold-up and soft-budget-constraint problems. The hold-up problem refers to the possibility
that relationship banks may extract rents thus causing ineﬃcient investment choices (see von Thad-
den (1995), and for a review Allen and Carletti (2008)), whereas the soft-budget-constraint problem
concerns the bank’s incentive to reﬁnance some of the ex-post ineﬃcient projects (Dewatripont and
Roland (2000)).
As there are conﬂicting predictions, and the empirical research has lagged theoretical devel-
opment, in the following empirical investigation it seems therefore crucial to account for ﬁrm
heterogeneity (small vs large, and low-tech vs high-tech) in order to identify and diﬀerentiate the
eﬀects of relationship lending on ﬁrm capacity to innovate in relation to ﬁrm characteristics.
4 Data description
The data used in this work are obtained by the two most recent waves - the 8th and the 9th - of
the comprehensive survey on Italian manufacturing ﬁrms carried out by Capitalia (and previously
by Mediocredito Centrale) every three years. These surveys are conducted through questionnaires,
administered to a representative sample of manufacturing ﬁrms within the national borders. The
sample is stratiﬁed with references to the number of employees, goods/services sectors and geo-
graphical area. Throughout the analysis I will rely on the provided sampling weights to extend
results to the overall population of Italian manufacturing ﬁrms, and to avoid inaccurate estimates
and standard errors. Questionnaires collected information over the previous three years (1998-2000
7and 2001-2003) and, for the majority of the ﬁrms, are supplemented with standard balance sheet
data1. The 8th and the 9th survey include respectively 4,289 and 4,497 ﬁrms. To broaden the
sample period of the analysis, I merged these two waves and obtained a reduced sample of 2,097
ﬁrms. This sample includes only those ﬁrms existing in both surveys and therefore with potentially
complete observations over the 1998-2003 period. I further excluded ﬁrms with incomplete infor-
mation to get a ﬁnal sample of 1,221 observations. I will progressively use the panel structure of
the data in order to check and address the endogeneity problems: in the next section I will present
result for a cross-section of ﬁrms surveyed in the ninth wave, whereas in the following sections I
will rely on both surveys performing panel data estimations.
Based on this sample, tables (1) and (2) report the population percentages (and standard
errors) of ﬁrms with either product or process innovation. The most important information is the
increasing percentage of innovative ﬁrms, across size and sectors, over the period considered (the
only exception is the share of ﬁrms with more than 500 employees doing process innovation). These
higher percentages reﬂect the higher number of ﬁrms doing R&D. As table (3) shows, particularly
in high-tech industries, the majority of ﬁrms are involved in R&D activities. This is even more
visible for larger ﬁrms where this percentage reached 92% in high-tech sectors2. Table (4) reports
the (population) mean of the variables measuring relationship lending for the period 2001-2003.
There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the duration of the relationship with the main bank, in
the bank main share, and in the number of lending banks between small low-tech and high-tech
ﬁrms, as well as for large low-tech and high-tech ﬁrms. There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences when
comparing these values according to the size variable. Interesting to note, however, is that there
are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences for small and large high-tech ﬁrms in the mean value of the variables
related to the main bank (duration and share).
1The principal information contained in the questionnaire concerns: general news on the company, its own-
ership, controlling interests, and membership of groups, workforce, investment activities, technological inno-
vation, research and development, internationalisation, commercial and competitive channels, ﬁnance. See
Survey of manufacturing enterprises http://www.unicredit-capitalia.eu/DOC/jsp/navigationDayOne/include_
content.jsp?parCurrentId=0b0030398053d889&parCurrentPage=indagini_manifatturiere.html&parLocale=en
2According to NACE classiﬁcation, ﬁrms where classiﬁed as in:
- low-tech sectors: textile, wood, food, plastic, paper, coke, non metallic and nec (not elsewhere classiﬁed).
- high-tech sectors: vehicles, machinery and chemicals
85 The empirical model and results
I adopt a generalized (Type 2) Tobit model consisting of two equations, where the ﬁrst one is a
probit equation determining whether a ﬁrm innovates or not (“propensity to innovate”), and the
second one is a linear regression (the Tobit equation or “intensity to innovate”) explaining how
much the ﬁrm innovates (Mohnen et al. (2006)). I will measure ﬁrm propensity to innovate by
means of new processes and new products introduced into the market, whereas the ﬁrm intensity
to innovate can be measured by the share of innovative sales in total sales. Contrary to other
type of surveys (i.e, Community Innovation Survey - CIS), it is not possible to distinguish between
innovative sales corresponding to products new to the ﬁrm but possibly known to the market,
which can be considered imitations of product already produced by other competitors, and those
corresponding to products only new to the market, which can be regarded as true innovations.
Denoting by di the binary variable indicating if ﬁrm i is an innovating ﬁrm - that is, a dummy
variable indicating whether the ﬁrm either has introduced at least one product or process innovation





= 1 if d∗
i > 0




i = zib1 + ei is a latent variable that represents the incentives to innovate. zi is a
vector of explanatory variables, b1 is a vector of parameter to be estimated, and ei is a random
error term, which includes the eﬀect of left-out omitted variables. As explanatory variables zi, in
addition to the amount of resources spent on R&D per employee [R&D_EXP] and ﬁxed capital
per employee[INV EST], I use sectoral dummies along with a high-tech dummy [HIGH_TECH],
ﬁrm size and age [SIZE], [AGE], and a dummy for listed company [LISTED]. The industry
dummy [HIGH_TECH] and sectoral dummies, capture technological opportunity conditions,
industry-targeted innovation policies, and high-tech speciﬁc diﬀerential demand growth eﬀect. Size
- measured by the number of employees - reﬂects access to ﬁnance, scale economies and diﬀerence in
the organization of work (Mohnen et al. (2006)). In order to account for the fact that young ﬁrms
grow faster, I add a dummy for ﬁrms that are less than three years old [Y OUNG]. It is valuable
9to include a dummy also for ﬁrms that underwent structural change [M&As] during the period of
the analysis and for ﬁrms operating in international markets [INTERNATIONAL COMP]3.
As the main objective of my investigation is to control how relationship lending aﬀects ﬁrm
innovativeness, I estimate the probability to be innovative controlling for relationship lending
including in the explanatory set, zi, variables representing
• the share of the main bank on total banking debt: [BANK_SHARE]
• the number of bank lenders: [NUM_BANKS]
• the duration of the relationship: [LENGTH]
Finally, to account for the possibility to have access to other sources of funding, I include in
the regressors a dummy variable, [FIN_INSTR], for ﬁrms that relied on innovative ﬁnancial
instruments, such as ﬁnancial bills or project ﬁnance. The second equation of the Tobit (type 2)
model is speciﬁed in terms of a second latent variable s∗
i which is equal to the actual share of
innovative sales yi, if the ﬁrm is innovative (i.e, d∗
i > 0). Since the share of innovative sales is
bounded by 0 and 1, it is preferable to perform a logit transformation of the data and express this
second equation in terms of the latent logit-share variable y∗
i = ln(s∗
i/(1 − s∗
i)) which vary from
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i = xib2 + ui.
xi is a vector of explanatory variables, b2 is a vector of parameters to be estimated and ui > 0
is an error term reﬂecting omitted variables. Since I have data on sale growth for the majority of
3All the analysis were also performed replacing SIZE with its logarithm and including a dummy equal to 1 for
ﬁrms included in a group. Results with the log of size do not change signiﬁcantly, whereas the group dummy variable
did not turn out to be signiﬁcant.
10the ﬁrms in the panel, I exploit the panel structure of the data in order to exclude the variable
past sales growth [g_salest−1] from the explanatory variables I have in xi, and to include it in
zi. This variable in fact can be a determining factor of innovation, as reﬂecting stronger demand
and easier internal and external access to ﬁnance. Moreover, relying on past sales growth as
exclusionary variable allows me to account for ﬁrm internal sources. I also present some results
using as exclusionary variable [rationedt−1], a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm
answered to be credit rationed in the previous survey. Results are substantially equals. However,
g_salest−1 seems more reliable since it based on balance sheet data - instead of being determined
by ﬁrm self assessment - and it oﬀers indications on the role of internal sources4.
Assuming that e and u are bivariate normal with zero mean, and σe = 1, I can estimate the
model as a generalized Tobit (type 2) model using STATA Heckman procedure for survey analysis.
Therefore, estimates will not refer to the sample but to the population of Italian ﬁrms. Preliminary
results for the model without considering any ﬁnancial variables are reported in table (5). Table
(6) reports results for the basic model relying on rationedt−1 instead of g_salest−1 as exclusionary
variable. Those preliminary results suggest the plausibility of the model, and the signiﬁcance of
the ρ coeﬃcient indicates selection problems in the intensity innovation equation. Results for
traditional regressors are in line with the literature. Firms with higher spending on R&D and ﬁxed
investments are those most likely to introduce an innovation. Larger and listed ﬁrms, especially in
high-tech industries, are also more likely to be innovative and to have a higher percentage of sales
stemming from innovative products. International agreements on production, as well as public
incentives, also positively aﬀect ﬁrm capacity to innovate.
In table (7) results for the model adding ﬁnancial variables are reported. These results evidence
that relationship variables do matter in explaining ﬁrm innovative capacity: the variables account-
ing for the share of the main bank and the number of lending banks are jointly highly signiﬁcant,
both in the intensity and propensity to innovate equation. However, theoretical and empirical
works suggest that the market for SME ﬁnance is imperfect (see, for example, Alessandrini et al.
4More precisely, ﬁrms are deﬁned to be credit rationed if answer yes to all the following question: 1. whether at
the current market interest rate they wish a larger amount of credit; 2. whether they would be willing to accept a
small increase in the interest rate charged in order to obtain more credit3. whether they have applied for credit but
have been turned down by the ﬁnancial intermediary.
11(2007); Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005); Carpenter and Petersen (2002)): the opportunity cost of
investments (the marginal cost of capital schedule) is higher for small ﬁrms (upward-sloping curve).
That means, SMEs that are in need of (external) capital are more likely to pursue some innovations
and positively aﬀected by long-term relationship with some banks. To account for this possibility,
and to control how it will aﬀect the role of bank relationship in fostering innovation, table (7) also
reports results for relationship variables interacted with a dummy variable for SMALL ﬁrms. At
1% level, a higher share of the major lending bank will have a positive eﬀects on the capacity of
small ﬁrms to translate innovation into a greater percentage of ﬁrm sales stemming from innova-
tive products, and at 5% level it will have a positive eﬀect on the probability of introducing an
innovation. On the other hand, contrary to what have been found by Herrera and Minetti (2007),
longer relationship may have counter positive eﬀect on ﬁrm capacity to innovate. However, the
overall eﬀect on both the capacity and intensity to innovate for small ﬁrms is not signiﬁcant. These
results are robust and reinforced if the exclusionary variable [g_salest−1] is replaced by a dummy
variable for ﬁrms being credit rationed in the previous survey (see table (8)).
5.1 Relationship Lending and Measure of Dependence on External Fi-
nance
Relying on the same set of variables used in the previous section, and by further exploiting the panel
structure of the data, in this section I will estimate the previous model by identifying industries’
technological demand for external ﬁnance. The reason for bringing into the picture this variable
is related to the necessity to control for some speciﬁc industry features which may aﬀect both the
ﬁrm capacity to innovate and the role of bank ties.
In order to do that, following Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) and diﬀerently from Benfratello
et al. (2007), I will compute my own measure for external dependence for Italian manufacturing
ﬁrms, amending the Rajan and Zingales (1998)’s methodology (RZ). The main assumption of RZ
is that there are technological reasons why some industries rely more on external ﬁnance than
others (i.e, gestation periods of products, the initial project scale, the cash harvest period). It
seems important therefore to look how these ’intrinsic’ industry features may aﬀect bank ties, and
ultimately ﬁrm capacity to innovate. It is reasonable to think that the eﬀects of relationship lending
12variables should vary with the needs of external capital: the more ﬁrms are dependent on external
ﬁnance, the stronger the ties with banks, and the higher the eﬀects on ﬁrm innovativeness.
However, it would be risky to assume that industry demands for external ﬁnancing in Italy will
be the same of large listed US ﬁrms. Shifting the focus to between industry diﬀerences, therefore,
I will measure external ﬁnance dependence using ﬁrm-level variables as collected during the eight
Capitalia survey. As in Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005), I estimate the measure of external ﬁnance,
using a ﬁnancial planning model (called also the percentage of sales approach, see Demirgüç-Kunt
and Maksimovic (2002)). This index, denoted by EFN, measures the proportion of ﬁrms whose
annual growth rate of sales exceeds the maximum growth rate that can be ﬁnanced if a ﬁrm relies
only on its internal resources and maintain its dividend (see box 1). Those ﬁrms whose actual
mean growth rates are above the maximum one are assumed to be in need of external ﬁnance.
The main advantage of computing this index is to (partially) control also for reverse causality.
As pointed out by Herrera and Minetti (2007), measures such as the length of the relationship
might be endogenous to the innovation process. The econometric speciﬁcation chosen, already
accounts for selectivity problem, as the signiﬁcance level of ρ coeﬃcient in the various speciﬁcation
indeed points out. Since the measure of external ﬁnancial dependence is computed at industry level
(NACE classiﬁcations), and using data from the eight survey, it is not aﬀected by the current ﬁrm
behaviour. The introduction of such an industry-level measure, in interaction with ﬁrm relationship
lending variables, should therefore account for the possibility that ﬁrms in some industries tend to
have on average longer/shorter ties with lending banks.
13Box 1: External Financial Need
The percentage of sales model relates a ﬁrm
growth rate to its need for external funds. The
external ﬁnancing need, FIN_NEEDt, at time
t growing at gt percent a year is given by
FIN_NEEDt = gtAssetst−(1+gt)Earningst∗bt
On the right hand side, the ﬁrst term is the re-
quired investment for growing at gt percent while
the second term is the internally available capital
for investment, taking bt - the proportion of the
ﬁrm earnings that are retained for reinvestment
at time t - as given. Earnings are calculated af-
ter interest and taxes. I compute two estimates
of each ﬁrm’s attainable growth rate. The max-
imum growth rate that can be ﬁnanced if a ﬁrm
relies only on its internal resources and maintains
its dividend, IG, is obtained by assuming that the
ﬁrm retains all its earnings (that is bt = 1), equat-
ing FIN_NEEDt to zero and solving for gt
IGt = ROAt/(1 − ROAt)
where ROA is the ﬁrm’s return on assets. Thus,
more proﬁtable ﬁrms can ﬁnd more resource inter-
nally. Then, I compare for each ﬁrm in the sample
its actual growth rate with the rate, IG, deﬁned
above.
Finally, I compute for each industry (according
to NACE classiﬁcation) the proportion of ﬁrms in
ﬁnancial needs, that is those ﬁrms whose mean
actual growth rate is above the mean maximum
attainable. To check the robustness of the mea-
sure, I also compute the same percentage, EFN,
assuming that ﬁrms does not pay dividend and
obtain just enough debt ﬁnancing to maintain
a constant ratio of total debt to assets (implic-
itly also a summing that the ﬁrm does not is-
sue equity or increase leverage). Again, setting
FIN_NEEDt to zero, and using the value of eq-
uity in place of total assets, the growth rate is
now equal to SG = ROE/(1 − ROE). These
measure are conservative in three ways. First,
each maximum growth assumes that a ﬁrm uti-
lizes the unconstrained sources of ﬁnance no more
intensively that it is currently doing. Second,
ﬁrms with spare capacity do not need to invest
and may grow at a faster rate than predicted by
the model. Third, the ﬁnancial planning model
abstract from technical advancement that reduce
the requirements for investment capital. Thus it
may overstate the cost of growth and underesti-
mate the maximum growth rate attainable using
unconstrained sources of ﬁnance (Demirgüç-Kunt
and Maksimovic (2002, 1998)).
Results are reported in table (9) using the ROE version of the EFN index (see Box 1). In the
ﬁrst two columns, the variable EFN is simply added to the basic model. In the last column of
table (9), EFN is introduced also in interaction with relationship lending variables (measured at
ﬁrm level)5. From that analysis three points deserve a remark. First of all, the coeﬃcient on EFN
is negative and signiﬁcant in both equations, suggesting that ﬁrms that grow faster, and which
are more in need of external ﬁnance, might ﬁnd diﬃcult to ﬁnance their innovation and bring new
products to the market. This result is in line with CIS survey results which highlighted that for
the majority of the Italian ﬁrms the main obstacles inhibiting innovation is still represented by
ﬁnancial factors. Secondly, even though the variables accounting for relationship lending turned
out to be jointly signiﬁcant, these regressions play down the importance of the share of the main
banks (although still positive for ﬁrm with higher EFN). Finally, the length of the relationship
and the number of lending banks become signiﬁcant - respectively at 6% and 10% level - in the
5In these regressions, to avoid problem of collinearity I remove sectoral dummies as the EFN index is computed
at industry level, though at a more disaggregated level. See also Rajan and Zingales (1998).
14propensity to innovate equation. In particular, they have a negative eﬀect on the probability of
introducing an innovation in those sectors that are more in ﬁnancial need. Even in this case, results
are not aﬀected if the exclusionary variable g_salest−1 is replaced by a dummy variable for ﬁrms
being credit rationed in the previous survey.
To sum up, the analysis performed controlling also for ﬁnancial need conﬁrms the important
role of the main bank in fostering innovation and suggest some possible counter positive eﬀects
when this relationship becomes longer.
5.2 Bank competition and Innovation
The level of competition among banks represents a factor which may either strengthen or weaken
ﬁrm ties with the bank. On the one hand, there are theories that argue that competition and
relationships are incompatible since banks may not enjoy the possibilities to extract proﬁt later
on in the relationship (Petersen and Rajan (1995)). On the other hand, other theories argue that
more competition may instead increase relationship lending, allowing banks to mitigate the eﬀects
of ﬁercer competition extracting higher rents (Boot (2000); Boot and Thakor (2000)). Empirical
works indeed suggest that competition and relationship lending are not necessary inimical (Degryse
and Ongena (2007), Elsas (2005)).
In order to bring this element into the analysis, I will compute an index of banking competition
at provincial level. The Italian territory is divided into 20 regions and 103 provinces, which are
geographical units similar to US counties. In accordance with the Italian Antitrust Authority, the
presumption is that the province is the relevant market. More speciﬁcally, I will include among
regressors the number of bank branches per squared kilometer [BANK_COMP] in each province.
The branch density represents the monopolistic power of each branch and could be considered as
a proxy of the (inverse of) transportation costs. More branches in the same provinces means, for
each consumer, a lower distance to cover to reach a branch, a weaker power exerted by bank branch
and an overall higher degree of competition (Degryse and Ongena (2005)).
BANK_COMP is a measure similar to the one propose by Benfratello et al. (2007), the
15number of branches per habitants6. In addition to that index, I also consider a traditional of
measure of market concentration, represented by sum of the market share of the ﬁrst three banks
[CH3]. Even in this case, I will focus on local markets by measuring market shares at the provincial
level using data on branches as proxies for the market share of individual (or group of) banks.
However, one must be cautious in interpreting this measure as a proxy of banking competition.
As Claessens and Laeven (2004) show, variables describing the banking system structure may
not be good summary statistics for bank competitive environment. Conversely, these authors
found that more concentrated banking system face a greater degree of competition. In this case,
BANK_COMP and CH3 are negatively correlated (-0.41599).
Table (10) presents results adding the banking competition controls. For both those measures,
there is a negative correlation with the ﬁrm innovativeness, in the introduction as well as in the
discovery phase. However, BANK_COMP is not signiﬁcant. The concentration index CH3
is instead jointly signiﬁcant with the EFN index at 5% level. This result suggests that less
concentrated credit markets might foster innovation (Spagnolo (2004)). It is also interesting to see
how that variable interacts with the external ﬁnancial need. Results are reported in the last two
columns of table (10). The relationship is negative and signiﬁcant both equations. However, it
is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the overall eﬀect in the discovery phase is zero. No
signiﬁcant interactions have been found between relationship lending variables and competition
variables (not reported).
6 Relationship lending in the discovery phase
Relying on the same set of (time-varying) variables used in the previous section, and by completely
exploiting the panel structure of the data, in this section I will focus on the eﬀects of bank ties in
the discovery phase only, in order to better control for endogeneity issues.
Given that I only have two observations about the introduction of innovation (in the eight and
ninth survey), it is not possible to fully address the endogeneity problems and to identify causal
6This measure can be considered as a proxy for the (inverse of) queuing costs. The less the population served by
each branch (or the higher the number of branches for each individual), the lower the cost met by the customers.
16links. However, since one fundamental problem is to control for unobserved ﬁrm characteristics that
are constant over time, the conditional logit model will work properly. Conditional logit models
eliminate the ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects, but only switchers (that is, ﬁrms that introduced an innovation
in just one of the two sub-periods) contribute to the likelihood function. Therefore, I can rely on a
restricted number of observations, as only around 40% of the sample is made up of switchers and
not all the explanatory variables are observed for all ﬁrms in both periods. I cannot control for
another potential source of endogeneity caused by technological shock that leads, for example, to
an increase both in the probability of observing an innovation and in the research intensity (Parisi
et al. (2006)).
As in the previous analysis, relationship lending variables turned out to be signiﬁcant in ex-
plaining the probability of introducing process or product innovations. In the model presented in
table (11), they are jointly signiﬁcant at 5% level. The most important result is again the role
played by the share of the main bank. However, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the
overall eﬀect for small ﬁrms is equal to zero. Banks do not seem play a crucial role in the discovery
phase for small ﬁrms. In the second column of table (11), I reestimate the model using a dummy
variable for R&D, in [R&D_EXP]’s stead, the variable measuring the amount of resource spent
in R&D per employee, since there are ﬁrms that have reported to do R&D but were not able to
indicate how much they spent for this purpose. In the same way, [INV E] - replacing [INV EST]
- is a dummy variable equals to 1 if a ﬁrm declared that has invested in ﬁxed capital but was not
able to indicate the amount. Results are substantially identical. Table (13) reports marginal eﬀects
for small ﬁrms computed at the mean level of the regressors. For the average small ﬁrm the share
of the main bank turned out to be negative and signiﬁcant, suggesting that for small ﬁrms having
a relationship bank may also have a negative eﬀect on the capacity to introduce an innovation.
In addition, in table (12), I repeat the same analysis but distinguishing the eﬀects for high-tech
and low-tech ﬁrms. Again, relationship variables are jointly signiﬁcant at 5% level. At 10% level,
it is also possible to reject the hypothesis that the variables representing bank ties are jointly equal
to zero for high-tech ﬁrms. Looking at high-tech ﬁrms, then, it seems that bank might play a
crucial role also in the introduction phase. In particular, for high-tech ﬁrms, also the length of the
17relationship turned out to be individually signiﬁcant at 10% level. Those results are conﬁrmed and
reinforced in column (2). The baseline results from column(2) also suggest that longer relationship
might have a negative eﬀect for low-tech ﬁrms. Table (14) reports marginal eﬀects for hight-tech
ﬁrms computed at the mean level for the regressors, which conﬁrms that for high-tech ﬁrms the
main bank can play a crucial rule in the discovery phase. A higher share of the main bank in total
banking debt increases the probability of being innovative by 1.3% compared to low-tech ﬁrms.
Tests of the conditional models conﬁrm at 5% level the presence of ﬁxed eﬀects for small ﬁrms,
whereas this hypothesis can be rejected for high-tech ﬁrms. For small ﬁrms, therefore, results from
the conditional model are robust to correlation of regressors with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in contrast
to the cross-section analysis. These results, however, are in line with the cross-section analysis,
suggesting that banks do not play a crucial role in the discovery phase for small ﬁrms.
Overall, these regressions conﬁrm the importance of bank ties in aﬀecting ﬁrm innovative ca-
pacity, even though this is particularly true for ﬁrms in high tech sectors. Then, in line with
the results of Herrera and Minetti (2007), it is possible to conclude that for small ﬁrms, banks
do not carry out a sophisticated intervention at the stage of assessment and development of new
technologies. For high-tech ﬁrms, instead, banks do play an important role in the discovery phase.
7 Relationship Lending in the introduction phase
In this section I will rely on a panel estimator in order to investigate the role of bank ties in
the introduction phase by estimating a selection model where both the selection and regression
equation may contain individual eﬀects which are correlated with explanatory variables. In recent
years a number of panel estimators have been suggested for these type of models (Dustmann and
Rochina-Barrachina (2007), Raymond et al. (2007)). In particular, I will use the two step estima-
tors approach proposed by Rochina-Barrachina (1999) which extend Heckman’s sample selection
technique developed in section 5 to the case where one correlated selection rule in two diﬀerent time
periods generated the sample. By nothing that for a ﬁrm which is innovative in two time periods -
and therefore has been selected into the second stage estimation - this estimator eliminates the ﬁrm
eﬀects from the equation of interest (3) by taking time diﬀerences, and then condition upon the
18outcome of the selection process being “one” (observed) in the two periods (Rochina-Barrachina
(1999)). This leads to two correction terms the form of which depends upon the assumption made
about the selection process and the joint distribution of unobservables. With consistent estimates
of these corrections terms, simple least squares can be used to obtain consistent estimates in the
second step.
More precisely, the estimated equation is now given by,
yi2 − yi1 = xi2 − xi1 + l12λ1(.) + l21λ2(.) + vi21
∆yi21 = ∆xi21 + l12λ1(.) + l21λ2(.) + vi21 (4)
where the subscript refers to time 1 and 2, and λ1 and λ2 are the two corrections terms.
To construct estimates of the λ terms a bivariate probit of equation (1) is estimated in the ﬁrst
step for the two waves. Then, only for the subsample d2 = d1 = 1, I do a regression of ∆y on ∆x
and ˆ λ to estimate the parameters of interest.
Results for the bivariate probit are not reported. However, estimations of the correlation
coeﬃcient turned out to be equal to 0.132 and signiﬁcant at 5% level. Table (15) and (16) reports
the second stage results for small ﬁrm and high-tech ﬁrms respectively where standard errors
have been corrected in oder to take into account ﬁrst stage estimation7. Though this estimator
drastically reduces the number of available observations in the second step, these regressions are
useful to make comparisons with the cross-sections analysis conducted in the previous section8.
For high-tech ﬁrms variables representing relationship lending turned out to be positive and jointly
signiﬁcant at 10% level, suggesting that relationship banks do play a role for high-tech ﬁrms in
the introduction phase as well. As the cross-section analysis suggested, for small ﬁrms relationship
banks play an important role in the introduction phase. In particular, this regression conﬁrms the
7For the asympotithic distribution and variance of this estimator see Rochina-Barrachina (1999) and Dustmann
and Rochina-Barrachina (2007).
8In any case, even in small sample, this estimator is less biased than estimator ignoring correction for sample
selection. Monte Carlo analysis also showed that is estimator is 1. robust to violation of conditional exchangeability
(that is, sample selection varying over time), 2. free from misspeciﬁcation aﬀecting the individual eﬀects in both
equations, 3.robust to correlation amongs variables over time, 4. and robust to violiation of the normality assumption
(Rochina-Barrachina (1999)).
19importance of the share of the main bank, which is again positive and signiﬁcant. In addition, and
also in line with the cross-section analysis, the competiton index turned out to be negative and
signiﬁcant at 5% level, suggesting that more concentrated banking market may not be favourable
to innovation.
8 Conclusions
Using data on sample of Italian manufacturing ﬁrms, this study investigated the eﬀects of relation-
ship lending on ﬁrm innovativeness, disentangling the impact of bank ties on the discovery phase
from that in the introduction phase and adoption of new technologies. As Schumpeter argued in
his earliest writing on the microeconomics of innovation (Schumpeter (1934, 1939), O’ Sullivan
(2004)), banks are pivotal players in the innovation process and play a central role in real-sector
innovation, not merely as a conduit for the movement of capital funds from savers to entrepreneurs.
In Italy, in particular, relationship lending has always been a way to channel funds to productive
investments, since both the stock market and specialized ﬁnanciers have played a marginal role.
However, despite the current richness of enterprise-based survey on innovative activity, there is
still little in the extant micro-economic literature about the diﬀerent role of the various sources of
funding in the introduction and invention of new technologies. On the contrary, at a macro-level,
there is a lively debate on the role of ﬁnancial architecture (bank-based versus market-based) in
fostering innovation and technology.
Results from the present micro-econometric analysis suggest that for small ﬁrms banks do not
carry out a sophisticated intervention at the development stage of the innovation. Similarly to what
found in other analysis, Italian banks appear to play their traditional role in ﬁnancing investments
of otherwise ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. In addition, the econometric analysis suggest that small
ﬁrms in more concentrated banking market are associated with a lower innovative capacity. Results
also indicate that longer relationship with the main bank can have negative eﬀects on ﬁrm capacity
to innovate for low-tech ﬁrms. The length of the relationship also exhibits negative and signiﬁcant
eﬀects on the probability of introducing an innovation in those sectors that are more in need of
external ﬁnance. On the contrary, relationship banks turned out to play an important role in both
20the discovery and introduction phases for ﬁrms in high-tech sectors. In that case, a higher share
and a longer relationship with the main lending bank have a positive impact on the capacity of
high-tech ﬁrms to innovate.
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26A APPENDIX I
In this section the variables used in the regressions are described. They are obtained from the 8th
and 9th survey on Italian manufacturing ﬁrms carried out by Capitalia every three years.
INNOVATION: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the enterprise reports having intro-
duced new production processes or products during 2001
Pct_SALES: Share of turnover in 2003 due to new products or process introduced during 2001-
2003.
R&D_EXP:Average total expenditure for internal and external R&D divided per employees over
the period 2001-2003.
R&D: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm reports to have done R&D during the
period 2001-2003.
INVEST: Average gross investments in innovative tangible goods per employees over the period
2001-2003.
INVE: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm reports to have invested in innovative
tangible during the period 2001-2003.
YOUNG: dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrms is less then three years old
SMALL: dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrms has less than 50 employees.
M&As: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm’s was involved in merger and acquisition
dealings.
INTERNATIONAL_COMP: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the enterprise’s most
signiﬁcant market is international (outside EU).
INTERNATIONAL_AGREEMENTS: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the en-
terprise has developed technical agreement with ﬁrms operating in international markets (outside
EU).
PATENTS_BOUGHT: dummy which takes the value 1 if the ﬁrms bought patents during the
period 2001-2003.
PATENTS_SOLD: dummy which takes the value 1 if the ﬁrms sold patents during the period
272001-2003.
PUBLIC_INCENTIVES: dummy which takes the value 1 if the ﬁrms relied on public incentives
during the period 2001-2003.
LISTED: dummy which takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm is listed in the stock market
SIZE: average number of employees during the period. 2001-2003
BANK_SHARE: the share of the main bank in total banking debt
length: the duration of the relationship with the main bank in years
NUM_BANKS: the number of bank lenders
FIN_INSTR: Dummy which takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm relied on innovative ﬁnancial instru-
ments during the period 2001-2003
BANK_COMP: number of branches per squared kilometer
CH3: market share of the ﬁrst three banks
EFN: index of external ﬁnancial dependence computed using ﬁrm-level variables as collected during
the period 1998-2000
g_sales[t-1]: the turnover growth rate computed using variables as collected during the period
1998-2000
rationed[t-1]: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm turned out be credit rationed
during the period 1998-2000
28Table 1: Share of ﬁrms with a product innovation
FIRMS SIZE LOW-TECH HIGH-TECH
(n◦ employees) 1998-2000 2001-2003 1998-2000 2001-2003
11-20 0.160 (0.014) 0.253 (0.027) 0.268 (0.017) 0.454 (0.034)
21-50 0.220 (0.015) 0.323 (0.032) 0.355 (0.016) 0.501 (0.027)
51-250 0.281 (0.030) 0.346 (0.039) 0.415 (0.015) 0.569 (0.022)
251-500 0.355 (0.064) 0.613 (0.076) 0.421 (0.046) 0.702 (0.050)
>500 0.598 (0.102) 0.671 (0.090) 0.391 (0.042) 0.426 (0.045)
() standard errors
Table 2: Share of ﬁrms with a process innovation
FIRM SIZE LOW-TECH HIGH-TECH
(n◦ employees) 1998-2000 2001-2003 1998-2000 2001-2003
11-20 0.287 (0.017) 0.321 (0.029) 0.287 (0.017) 0.297 (0.031)
21-50 0.364 (0.018) 0.397 (0.033) 0.371 (0.016) 0.417 (0.026)
51-250 0.490 (0.034) 0.497 (0.041) 0.494 (0.015) 0.508 (0.023)
251-500 0.460 (0.066) 0.660 (0.074) 0.498 (0.047) 0.614 (0.053)
>500 0.534 (0.102) 0.549 (0.099) 0.494 (0.043) 0.379 (0.044)
() standard errors
29Table 3: Share of ﬁrms doing R&D
FIRMS SIZE LOW-TECH HIGH-TECH
(n◦ employees) 1998-2000 2001-2003 1998-2000 2001-2003
11-20 0.216 (0.016) 0.372 (0.030) 0.220 (0.016) 0.462 (0.034)
21-50 0.317 (0.017) 0.529 (0.034) 0.347 (0.016) 0.590 (0.026)
51-250 0.452 (0.034) 0.720 (0.037) 0.480(0.015) 0.704 (0.020)
251-500 0.632 (0.066) 0.879 (0.051) 0.561 (0.047) 0.783 (0.049)
>500 0.835 (0.079) 0.873 (0.069) 0.791 (0.044) 0.923 (0.031)
() standard errors
Table 4: Summary statistics: population mean - Period 2001-2003
BANK_SHARE LENGTH NUM_BANKS
LARGE & LOW_TECH 30.3299 20.0506 7.0150
(1.451) (0.819) (0.235)
LARGE & HIGH_TECH 32.1561 18.0048 6.8789
(2.009) (1.013) (0.260)
SMALL & LOW_TECH 35.3025 16.8680 4.1788
(0.913) (0.330) (0.068)
SMALL & HIGH_TECH 34.0666 17.0709 4.1107
(1.558) (0.582) (0.102)
Small ﬁrms: less than 50 employees
30Table 5: Estimation results: Heckman base results
In the intensity equation the dependent variable is a logit transformation of the actual share of innovative sales
whereas in the propensity equation the dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the ﬁrm has
introduced at least one product or process innovation. The exclusionary variable is g_sales[t−1]
Intensity Propensity
Eq(2) Eq(1)
R&D_EXP 0.2183*** (0.028) 0.1533*** (0.034)
INVEST 0.1254 (0.096) 0.1281** (0.058)
YOUNG -2.4709** (1.094) -0.3976 (0.430)
AGE 0.0007 (0.006) 0.0007 (0.003)
SIZE 0.0005 (0.001) 0.0025*** (0.001)
M&As 0.9037*** (0.333) 0.2551* (0.152)
INTERNATIONAL_COMP 0.1231 (0.218) 0.1583 (0.110)
PATENTS_BOUGHT -0.0075 (0.522) 0.1546 (0.295)
PATENTS_SOLD -1.9400** (0.933) -0.7234* (0.383)
INTERNATIONAL_AGREEMENTS 0.3026 (0.342) 0.3881** (0.181)
PUBLIC_INCENTIVES 0.6413*** (0.219) 0.3233*** (0.090)
LISTED 2.2038** (0.886) 1.5150*** (0.393)
HIGH_TECH 1.8308* (1.096) 0.9921* (0.569)
g_salest−1 0.3711** (0.176)






Note: Regressions include dummies for area and sectors
31Table 6: Estimation results: Heckman base results
In the intensity equation the dependent variable is a logit transformation of the actual share of innovative sales
whereas in the propensity equation the dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the ﬁrm has
introduced at least one product or process innovation. The exclusionary variable is rationed[t−1]
Intensity Propensity
Eq(2) Eq(1)
R&D_EXP 0.2167*** (0.028) 0.1541*** (0.035)
INVEST 0.1172 (0.096) 0.1434** (0.061)
YOUNG -2.3066** (1.098) -0.3482 (0.423)
AGE 0.0003 (0.006) 0.0005 (0.003)
SIZE 0.0004 (0.000) 0.0027*** (0.001)
M&As 0.8728*** (0.331) 0.2689* (0.153)
INTERNATIONAL_COMP 0.1034 (0.217) 0.1661 (0.111)
PATENTS_BOUGHT -0.0223 (0.518) 0.1720 (0.299)
PATENTS_SOLD -1.8618** (0.892) -0.7088* (0.380)
INTERNATIONAL_AGREEMENTS 0.2823 (0.341) 0.3821** (0.183)
PUBLIC_INCENTIVES 0.6222*** (0.221) 0.3336*** (0.091)
LISTED 2.1773** (0.880) 1.5717*** (0.389)
HIGH_TECH 1.8949* (1.089) 0.9032 (0.578)
rationed_t-1 0.4110** (0.202)






Note: Regressions include dummies for area and sectors
32Table 7: Estimation results: Heckman adding ﬁnancial variables
Intensity Propensity Intensity Propensity
Eq(2) Eq(1) Eq(2) Eq(1)
R&D_EXP 0.2207*** 0.1482*** 0.2216*** 0.1482***
(0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.033)
INVEST 0.1173 0.1310** 0.1133 0.1311**
(0.098) (0.058) (0.098) (0.058)
YOUNG -2.6916** -0.4072 -2.6344** -0.3893
(1.071) (0.422) (1.082) (0.422)
AGE 0.0022 0.0006 0.0024 0.0006
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
SIZE 0.0002 0.0019*** -0.0002 0.0020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
M&As 0.8191** 0.2301 0.8174** 0.2347
(0.345) (0.156) (0.345) (0.156)
INTERNATIONAL_COMP 0.1074 0.1429 0.1172 0.1471
(0.224) (0.107) (0.225) (0.108)
PATENTS_BOUGHT -0.1062 0.0943 -0.0283 0.1140
(0.500) (0.281) (0.486) (0.278)
PATENTS_SOLD -1.7935** -0.7477** -1.9353** -0.6984*
(0.860) (0.378) (0.921) (0.385)
INTERNATIONAL_AGREEMENTS 0.2255 0.3539** 0.2264 0.3480**
(0.357) (0.177) (0.354) (0.177)
PUBLIC_INCENTIVES 0.6466*** 0.2927*** 0.6425*** 0.2922***
(0.222) (0.090) (0.222) (0.090)
LISTED 2.2320** 1.7045*** 2.3901*** 1.6305***
(0.872) (0.382) (0.803) (0.384)
BANK_SHARE 0.0096** 0.0031** -0.0015 0.0001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003)
NUM_BANKS 0.0843** 0.0353** 0.0731** 0.0363**
(0.033) (0.016) (0.035) (0.018)
LENGTH -0.0130 0.0006 0.0122 0.0042
(0.011) (0.005) (0.013) (0.006)
FIN_INSTR -0.2112 0.4223* 1.3282** 0.6071*
(0.500) (0.255) (0.672) (0.329)
HIGH_TECH 1.8476* 0.9688* 1.9066* 0.9742*











Constant -10.9902*** -5.5691*** -11.2809*** -5.4136***
(2.133) (0.929) (2.023) (0.938)
ρ 0.8775*** (0.075) 0.8755*** (0.075)
σ 1.8086*** (0.164) 1.8180*** (0.160)
ll -34206.22 -33901.71
N 564 1221 564 1221
*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
Note: Regressions include dummies for area and sectorsTable 8: Estimation results: Heckman results adding ﬁnancial variables
Intensity Propensity Intensity Propensity
Eq(2) Eq(1) Eq(2) Eq(1)
R&D_EXP 0.2334*** 0.1448*** 0.2343*** 0.1453***
(0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
INVEST -0.0088 0.0117* -0.0088 0.0119*
(0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006)
YOUNG -2.8194*** -0.4563 -2.7508*** -0.4389
(1.040) (0.417) (1.034) (0.415)
AGE -0.0063 0.0002 -0.0060 0.0002
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
M&As 0.6974** 0.2246 0.6935** 0.2323
(0.351) (0.153) (0.351) (0.153)
INTERNATIONAL_COMP 0.3144 0.1571 0.3135 0.1608
(0.235) (0.105) (0.236) (0.105)
PATENTS_BOUGHT 0.1157 0.2177 0.2069 0.2316
(0.567) (0.288) (0.545) (0.283)
PATENTS_SOLD -1.8683** -0.7164** -1.9560** -0.6767*
(0.801) (0.364) (0.842) (0.356)
INTERNATIONAL_AGREEMENTS 0.4207 0.2851* 0.4329 0.2747
(0.353) (0.168) (0.350) (0.167)
PUBLIC_INCENTIVES 0.6444*** 0.3072*** 0.6363*** 0.3053***
(0.239) (0.091) (0.240) (0.092)
LISTED 2.5990*** 1.6244*** 2.7276*** 1.6237***
(0.917) (0.367) (0.811) (0.357)
SIZE 0.0007 0.0016*** 0.0000 0.0018**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
BANK_SHARE 0.0095** 0.0030* -0.0022 -0.0010
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003)
NUM_BANKS 0.0727** 0.0390** 0.0670* 0.0403**
(0.035) (0.016) (0.037) (0.017)
LENGTH -0.0100 0.0003 0.0197 0.0050
(0.012) (0.005) (0.013) (0.006)
FIN_INSTR -0.4546 0.3339 1.2181* 0.5497*
(0.543) (0.249) (0.729) (0.330)
HIGH_TECH 0.2514 0.2158** 0.2610 0.2188**











Constant -10.0185*** -4.3766*** -10.1754*** -4.3645***
(1.958) (0.756) (1.764) (0.745)
ρ 0.9265*** (0.077) 0.9242*** (0.077)
σ 1.8187*** (0.181) 1.8317*** (0.177)
ll -33989.84 -33920.19
N 564 1223 564 1223
34Table 9: Estimation results: Heckman considering external ﬁnancial need
Intensity Propensity Intensity Propensity
Eq(2) Eq(1) Eq(2) Eq(1)
R&D_EXP 0.2313*** 0.1455*** 0.2320*** 0.1484***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
INVEST -0.0043 0.0122* -0.0030 0.0148**
(0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006)
YOUNG -2.8809*** -0.4646 -2.8493*** -0.4987
(1.045) (0.414) (1.045) (0.419)
AGE -0.0039 0.0008 -0.0039 0.0005
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
M&As 0.7492** 0.2249 0.7900** 0.2233
(0.344) (0.152) (0.342) (0.147)
INTERNATIONAL_COMP 0.3105 0.1379 0.2966 0.1351
(0.235) (0.103) (0.234) (0.104)
PATENTS_BOUGHT 0.0842 0.1535 0.0284 0.1790
(0.548) (0.286) (0.548) (0.295)
PATENTS_SOLD -1.8732** -0.7391** -1.8391** -0.7275**
(0.798) (0.357) (0.805) (0.363)
INTERNATIONAL_AGREEMENTS 0.4183 0.2912* 0.4313 0.2815*
(0.357) (0.166) (0.353) (0.163)
PUBLIC_INCENTIVES 0.6317*** 0.2923*** 0.6235*** 0.2922***
(0.235) (0.091) (0.234) (0.091)
LISTED 2.3161** 1.5363*** 2.2356** 1.4683***
(0.913) (0.366) (0.889) (0.379)
SIZE 0.0006 0.0014*** 0.0005 0.0014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BANK_SHARE 0.0098** 0.0030* 0.0025 -0.0040
(0.004) (0.002) (0.029) (0.013)
NUM_BANKS 0.0766** 0.0391** 0.3077 0.2915**
(0.035) (0.016) (0.231) (0.119)
LENGHT -0.0118 0.0006 0.0649 0.0629*
(0.012) (0.005) (0.091) (0.033)
FINANCIAL_INSTR -0.3519 0.3861 -0.3020 0.4038*
(0.534) (0.242) (0.530) (0.238)
HIGH_TECH -0.0099 0.1466 -0.0225 0.1597
(0.267) (0.106) (0.266) (0.106)
EFN -4.9329** -1.3892* -0.6898 2.5253









Constant -7.0750*** -3.5296*** -9.0154*** -5.3868***
(2.218) (0.869) (3.053) (1.261)
ρ 0.9265*** (0.076) 0.9241*** (0.075)
σ 1.8518*** (0.177) 1.8588*** (0.169)
ll -33905.42 -33805.31
N 564 1221 564 1221
*p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01
Note: Regressions include dummies for area
35Table 10: Estimation results: Heckman considering bank competition
Eq(2) Eq(1) Eq(2) Eq(1) Eq(2) Eq(1)
R&D_EXP 0.2338*** 0.1464*** 0.2333*** 0.1468*** 0.2306*** 0.1466***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033)
INVEST -0.0336 0.1215* -0.0261 0.1195* -0.0078 0.1304**
(0.112) (0.063) (0.109) (0.062) (0.110) (0.062)
YOUNG -2.9290*** -0.4531 -2.8762*** -0.4620 -2.8982*** -0.4755
(1.048) (0.413) (1.040) (0.413) (1.047) (0.420)
AGE -0.0036 0.0009 -0.0041 0.0006 -0.0038 0.0007
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
SIZE 0.0006 0.0014*** 0.0006 0.0014*** 0.0006 0.0014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
M&As 0.7403** 0.2261 0.7404** 0.2449 0.7613** 0.2573*
(0.345) (0.152) (0.348) (0.154) (0.349) (0.156)
INTERN._COMP 0.3132 0.1436 0.3039 0.1461 0.3139 0.1508
(0.235) (0.103) (0.236) (0.104) (0.235) (0.104)
PAT._BOUGHT 0.0323 0.1436 0.1030 0.1776 0.1212 0.2024
(0.547) (0.286) (0.557) (0.289) (0.555) (0.294)
PAT._SOLD -1.8950** -0.7409** -1.8560** -0.7402** -1.9030** -0.7708**
(0.789) (0.353) (0.812) (0.355) (0.818) (0.362)
INTERN._AGREEM. 0.4017 0.2955* 0.4018 0.2936* 0.3817 0.2778
(0.360) (0.167) (0.360) (0.171) (0.363) (0.170)
PUBLIC_INCEN. 0.6011** 0.2890*** 0.6409*** 0.3041*** 0.6202*** 0.2935***
(0.237) (0.091) (0.238) (0.091) (0.239) (0.092)
LISTED 2.3178*** 1.5419*** 2.3317** 1.5884*** 2.3673*** 1.6274***
(0.884) (0.359) (0.928) (0.375) (0.915) (0.377)
BANK_SHARE 0.0095** 0.0030* 0.0098** 0.0031** 0.0096** 0.0030*
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
NUM_BANKS 0.0730** 0.0387** 0.0774** 0.0399** 0.0755** 0.0392**
(0.035) (0.016) (0.035) (0.016) (0.035) (0.016)
LENGHT -0.0120 0.0008 -0.0122 0.0012 -0.0113 0.0013
(0.012) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005)
FIN_INSTR -0.3765 0.3849 -0.3786 0.3949 -0.4365 0.3745
(0.531) (0.242) (0.535) (0.242) (0.525) (0.240)
HIGH_TECH -0.0223 0.1496 -0.0076 0.1501 0.0051 0.1550
(0.267) (0.106) (0.268) (0.106) (0.267) (0.106)
EFN -5.1281*** -1.3884* -4.7600** -1.3132* 11.4127 7.1867*
(1.939) (0.795) (1.908) (0.789) (9.914) (3.735)
INDEX_COMP -38.7714 -2.9032
(42.496) (17.775)
CH3 -0.2764 -0.7049 14.9524 7.3773**
(1.223) (0.502) (9.353) (3.556)
CH3xEFN -29.9252* -15.7572**
(18.115) (6.821)
g_salest−1 0.2752* 0.2469* 0.2672*
(0.152) (0.144) (0.147)
Constant -6.8158*** -3.5345*** -7.0716*** -3.3181*** -15.3394*** -7.7401***
(2.200) (0.867) (2.308) (0.903) (5.635) (2.120)
ρ 0.9266*** (0.075) 0.9306*** (0.076 ) 0.9260*** (0.076)
σ 1.8592*** (0.172) 1.8991*** (0.180) 1.8732*** (0.178)
ll -33960.81 -33922.26 -33806.81
N 564 1221 564 1221 564 1221
*p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01
Note: Regressions include dummies for area
36Table 11: Estimation results: Conditional logit for small ﬁrms
In this model only switchers - that is, ﬁrms that introduced an innovation in just one of the two periods - contribute
to the likelihood function. It controls for unobserved ﬁrm characteristics that are constant over time. The dependent













































37Table 12: Estimation results: Conditional logit for high-tech ﬁrms
In this model only switchers - that is, ﬁrms that introduced an innovation in just one of the two periods - contribute
to the likelihood function. It controls for unobserved ﬁrm characteristics that are constant over time. The dependent













































38Table 13: Marginal eﬀects for small ﬁrms
This table reports marginal eﬀects for relationship lending variables for small ﬁrms. For these ﬁrms relationship
variables have been interacted with a small-ﬁrm dummy variable. The marginal eﬀects for the conditional logit are
equal to ((1 + exp(xb1))−1 ∗ (exp(xb1)/(1 + exp(xb1))) ∗ (b[relationship_var] + b[relationship_var ∗ SMALL])) −
((1+exp(xb0))−1 ∗(exp(xb0)/(1+exp(xb0))))∗(b[relationship_var]) where xb1 and xb0 are the linear predictions
computed at mean level for the remaining regressors and the SMALL variable equals to 1 and zero respectively.








Table 14: Marginal eﬀects for high-tech ﬁrms
This table reports marginal eﬀects for relationship lending variables for high-tech ﬁrms. For these ﬁrms relation-
ship variables have been interacted with a high-tech dummy variable. The marginal eﬀects for the conditional
logit are equal to ((1 + exp(xb1))(−1 ∗ (exp(xb1)/(1 + exp(xb1))) ∗ (b[relationship_var] + b[relationship_var ∗
HIGH_TECH])) − ((1 + exp(xb0))−1 ∗ (exp(xb0)/(1 + exp(xb0)))) ∗ (b[relationship_var]) where xb1 and xb0 are
the linear predictions computed at mean level for the remaining regressors and the HIGH_TECH variable equals









39Table 15: Heckman panel estimator for small ﬁrms (Rochina 1999)
Two-stage panel estimation. The ﬁrst step (not reported), is a bivariate probit using all the observation to estimate
λ1 and λ2. In the second step, for the subsample of ﬁrms that innovate in both period, that is with d1 = 1 and





























Number of obs 711
Subpop size 64
*p<0.10,** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
40Table 16: Heckman panel estimator for high-tech ﬁrms (Rochina 1999)
Two-stage panel estimation. The ﬁrst step (not reported), is a bivariate probit using all the observation to estimate
λ1 and λ2. In the second step, for the subsample of ﬁrms that innovate in both period, that is with d1 = 1 and































Number of obs 767
Subpop size 67
*p<0.10,** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
41